WAR, PEACE & PEOPLE

Thursday, June 23, 2005

Brave soldiers, flawed leadership

On of the strangest aspects of the Iraq War has been the near obsessional focus by commentators on troop numbers to the exclusion of virtually any serious analysis of how the war has been fought to date by the generals in charge.

In war, precedent over millenia shows that outstanding leadership is crucial - and is frequently more important than troop numbers. In fact, one highly regarded military thinker, Colonel John Boyd, analysed just about every well known battle since we started killing each other and came to the consclusion that it was the smaller side which won in the majority of cases.

Great generals - great leaders - are that important.

The courage of the average American soldier or marine is not in question, but there is ever increasing evidence that we have a serious problem with some of our generals - and maybe more than some. In the light of the evidence of history, this should not be surprising. The kind of soldier who gets to the top in peacetime tends to have a more bureaucratic and conformist mentality - in blunt contrast to the kind of charismatic, creative, thinkers we tend to need in time of war.

Precisely why we so consistently promote the wrong people in time of peace is an important question to be answered at some other time.

In time of war, especially with conduct on the battlefield providing clear proof of caliber, or the lack of it, the traditional and well-proven solution is to sack the uniformed bureacrats who don't know how to fight - and frequently do not want to (a fact we are going to have to face up to) - and re-shuffle the deck so that the thinking mavericks, with a will to win, are put in charge. That happened with a vengeance in World War II when General George Marshall took a veritable scythe to the Officer Corps and allowed talents like George Patton to emerge. It happened again in Korea where heads had to roll before General Mathew Ridgeway finally got a grip on things. It even happened in Vietnam except at the top where, unfortunately, the wrong man, General Westmoreland, was left in charge for far too long - with disastrous results. Nonetheless, the situation on the ground could have been much worse if drastic action had not been taken to replace a significant number of incompetent senior officers.

There was, even in Vietnam, some accountability, even if not enough.

What makes the present situation in Iraq so different is that the current Administration seems to be unwilling to sack any senior general officer despite mounting evidence of truly mediocre leadership up to and including, Combatant Commander level. It is as if there is a faustian bargain between the Bush Administration and the generals which says, in effect: "If you do not question our extremely dubious policies - such as the occupation of Iraq without any proper planning, then we won't question your military incompetence. We'll all go along to get along and the media and the American public will stay silent because they don't want to appear to be failing to support the troops."

This sick bargain explains, in no small part, why we are in the mess in Iraq which we are in today and why the country is $300 billion poorer - so far.

By the way, these comments are not made without considerable inside knowledge of the Army General Officer Corps, but, independent of that, the current situation in Iraq speaks for itself. Insurgent activity is not down; it is up. American casualties are not down; they are increasing. And there is no end in sight.

These observations have been prompted by watching a segment of the Senate Armed Services Committee's hearing featuring Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Chief of Staff General Myers, Combatant Commander General Abizaid and Iraq Commander General Casey.

The evasiveness and manifest discomfort of these witnesses spoke volumes.


Victor.