“I was only following orders.” The very, very model of a modern Major General – and that’s the problem.

On March 19, 2006, recently retired Major General Paul D. Eaton, in an Op-Ed in The New York Times, called for the immediate dismissal of his erstwhile boss, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld.

Rumsfeld, he argued, “is not competent to lead our armed forces.” He went on to state: “In sum, he (Rumsfeld) has shown himself incompetent strategically, operationally and tactically, and is far more than anyone else responsible for what has happened to our important mission in Iraq.”

Major General Eaton then went on to say: “In the five years, Mr. Rumsfeld has presided over the Pentagon, I have seen a climate of groupthink become dominant and a growing reluctance by experienced military men and civilians to challenge the notions of the senior leadership.”

Brave stuff – and there is no doubt that Secretary Rumsfeld has a great deal to answer for – but it misses the key point that that the our Army generals are at least as much to blame. In effect, General Eaton is trying to distance the Club of Generals from the fiasco in Iraq – and his accusations will not stand because it was and remains the job of those very same generals to implement the policies of the administration, and the evidence quite clearly shows that their track record has been abysmal.

Look no further than the results after three years of war in Iraq. Precisely how can one invade a country with no plans for what do after the invasion is successful? That defies credulity. Then consider the fact that one of the poorest nations in the world has fought the richest nation in the world to a halt even though we are spending $6.8 billion a month there. That is a demonstration of incompetence by those in charge, the generals, on an epic scale. Then factor in Abu Ghraib and the consistent way in which the blame has been kept away from general officers – even when the evidence points clearly in their direction.

Simply put, the generals must be held accountable too. They are the interface between policy and action, and the notion that they can wriggle out of responsibility because they had not got the guts to stand up to Secretary Rumsfeld is more a condemnation of the lack of character of our generals than a criticism of the Secretary.

Honorable generals resign – and then speak out publicly - when asked to do things they are fundamentally opposed to. Instead, the current crop of generals has chosen to put its careers ahead of country, its lavishly paid defense contractor retirement jobs ahead of the welfare of its soldiers, and to adopt the Nuremburg strategy: I was only following orders. It’s someone else’s fault.

That will not do. When you are a general, with all the authority, prestige, rewards and responsibilities of such a position, you have a proportionate duty of care towards the nation you have sworn to defend. If you take your oath as an officer seriously, you do not have the option to be a moral coward and to take refuge in groupthink. Morally, you must do the right thing. It is your obligation as an American soldier, and it is your sworn duty as a general.

Or it used to be. All too many of the current crop seem to lack the competence, character and values which the rank of general requires.

Retired Major General Eaton concludes his article by urging that Congress must assert itself. He points out: “Too much power has shifted to the executive branch, not just in terms of waging war but also in planning the military of the future. Congress should remember it still has the power of the purse; it should call our generals, colonels, captains and sergeant to testify frequently…”

He is partially right, but he misses the two main points: Firstly, the Senate needs to pay much closer attention to the caliber of the generals it confirms. Secondly, it must hold the generals of this Great Nation accountable in the fullest sense of the word – or Iraq will merely be another name on a list of grotesquely expensive military disasters.

What is war, anyway? And is there a connection with oil at $72 a barrel?

Most of us tend to think of war as armed conflict between military forces – whether regular or irregular – but I have come to the conclusion we would be wiser to adopt a much broader working definition, and to adapt ourselves accordingly. Right now we’re spending truly vast sums of the nation’s scarce resources on preparing for, and fighting, conventional wars, while ignoring a significant range of threats which can cause at least as much damage – and, arguably, more - to the essence of this country, compared with, for instance, conventional military weapons such as aircraft or tanks or submarines.

In short, we’re wearing intellectual blinkers which is never a good idea when one is surrounded by dangers which emanate from the full spectrum.

What are these additional threats – or, at least, those we know about? The range is wide, and includes both obvious menaces to our national wellbeing, such as economic warfare (which most people don’t understand), and much fuzzier dangers such as an inadequately educated and informed public, a Congress that is in thrall to commercial interests, a food chain that is in deep trouble, an infrastructure that is seriously frayed, the loss of our manufacturing base, a balance of payments deficit that is approaching a trillion dollars a year, a budget deficit that is approaching half a trillion dollars a year, an unhealthy addiction to oil – and so on; and on; and on.

We’ve acquired some bad habits over the years; and some very bad leaders. Circumstances, or someone’s deliberate design? Well, that is a very good question.

Now you may say that these additional threats not only have nothing to do with war, but are not being (and cannot be) used by our enemies – so should scarcely be the concern of our warfighters. In reply, I would merely request that you think more deeply about these issues because I think the logic of what I am saying will finally hit home. But, first let me add a little context.

It is my belief that our enemies – mostly smart people with patience - know perfectly well that they cannot defeat us in a head on traditional military confrontation, so, instead, have adopted a multi-faceted long term strategy in which we are encouraged to defeat ourselves – with a little help from behind the scenes. Here, I don’t see defeat as the U.S. being laid waste, much as Germany was in 1944, but more as a steady process whereby we are seriously weakened over time to a point where we can no longer influence events, and become irrelevant to the ambitions of others. You could call it ‘Defeat by a Thousand Cuts.’ Others may see it more as process of being bled to death; or being strangled very slowly. Ironically, may Americans may not even notice the whole business happening until the negative trends are irreversible. War by stealth, you might say. It is scarcely a new invention. Sun Tzu was born in China in 500BC and one of his most famous sayings is: “The best battle is the battle that is won without being fought.” He did not see war as breaking things and killing people – unless there was absolutely no alternative.

The trouble with our current, blinkered, attrition oriented approach is that not only are we failing to recognize the threats we are up against, but that we are producing warfighting leaders who are entirely inadequate to their tasks. To them, war is about blowing up a target set, and having Kellogg, Brown and Root provide “comfort while you kill.” The downside, that such mindless brutality creates enemies faster than we can kill them, both in the country in question, and internationally, seems to be missed.

As a consequence, we had Vietnam, but paid no attention to the clear lessons of that war. So, now we have Iraq at $6.8 billion a month out of the U.S. taxpayers’ pockets (and that is only part of it). And, as an added bonus, the price of oil has risen to $72 a barrel – over three times the price it was at before the invasion.

Worse yet, a great deal of that extra money is going to finance the very people and nations who hate us most. No wonder the Iranians can afford nuclear weapons. We’re giving them the money – and, by threatening them, and creating instability, we are driving up the price of oil.

We need to re-think how we think about the American way of war.